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1. Deception in defense of 
information systems 
a.  Implement specific tactics to deceive 
hackers, and test them out 
a.  In Web services 
b.  In operating-system file utilities 
c.  In other parts of the operating system  
b.  Use distributed intrusion detection to 
obtain a probability you’re under attack 
Deceptive software      
•  Everyone assumes “information assurance” 
means military networks are a fortress to 
protect. 
•  But there are other military tactics: What about 
deception? 
•  Deceptive decoys can provide distributed 
defense to attack, and responses proportional to 
the degree of attack. 
•  Deception can involve lies about files and 
processing status. 
When do you deceive? 
•  For defense, not analysis (unlike a honeypot) 
•  As a temporary delaying tactic – deception 
has a long honorable history in military tactics 
•  When simple effects can satisfy an attacker 
(e.g. denial of service) 
•  Against a hands-on adversary with some 
intelligence (unlike a script kiddie) 
•  Hence for defense during information warfare 
General decoy 
architecture Attacker 























































A time exaggeration function 
actual transaction time t 
faked transaction time T 
T = t 
T = e(t) 
Two fake windows we studied 
A fake directory system 
Example “Decoy Control List” 
Resource Action Decoy response 
C:\Program Files write Fake a correct write by providing 




write Behave normally 
C:\Program Files read Give fake info if any specified,  
otherwise the real info 
C:\Program Files execute Give one of 10 random error 
messages if a fake write done,  
else execute normally 




Lineprinter lpt1 read, 
write 
Give error message if file in  
"secrets"; delay 10 times normal 




























Avg Net Util -- No Agent
Avg Net Util -- Agents
Avg Max Util - No Agent
Avg Max Util - Agent
Performance of distributed intrusion detection 
2. Data mining 
a. Finding and indexing images on the Web  
b. Collecting intelligence about enemies 
automatically on the Web 
c. Automatically finding security problems on 
Web sites 
d. Graphical interfaces to multimedia 
databases 
e. Mission-summary displays that 
automatically summarize information from 
many different Web sites  
 
Example Web page 
Example  raw MARIE-4 Web-caption data 
www.navo.hpc.mil/Conferences/UGC/Pics/pages/P4290376.htm | www.navo.hpc.mil/
Conferences/UGC/Pics/images/P4290376.jpg |  |  | filename | 1088 | 1146 | navo hpc 
Conferences UGC Pics jpg 
home.dcma.mil/onebook/0.0/0.3/OPT/2-15.htm | home.dcma.mil/onebook/0.0/ 0.3/OPT/
images/2_15.gif | 185 | 185 | p | 3256 | 3797 | In DCMA, team membership is 
considered part of the job, not a sideline. Team members should: Participate 
thoroughly. Take ownership of the team's purpose and process. Share all information 
needed by the team. Volunteer to complete tasks or carry them out as assigned by the 
team leader. Consult with the team leader and the facilitator on how best to proceed. 
Consult with their own managers on how best to represent their organizations. 
home.dcma.mil/onebook/0.0/0.3/OPT/2-17.htm | home.dcma.mil/onebook/0.0/0.3/OPT/
images/2_17.gif | 185 | 185 | title | 16 | 60 | Operating Principles/Teaming Training 
home.dcma.mil/onebook/0.0/0.3/OPT/2-17.htm | home.dcma.mil/onebook/0.0/0.3/OPT/
images/2_17.gif | 185 | 185 | li | 3332 | 3463 | The number of team members should be 
somewhere between 5 and 12. Too few limit the team's creativity; too many slow 
down the team. 
dod.mil/webmasters/technical/heuristic_eval.htm | dod.mil/graphics/heuristic1.gif | 566 | 
200 | wording | 17177 | 17213 | Consider the hierarchy in Figure 1. 
dod.mil/pubs/dswa/document.html | dod.mil/pubs/dswa/table1.gif |  |  | wording | 15325 | 
15540 | As outlined in Figures 1 and 2, spending on strategic offensive forces is at less 
than one-half of the Cold War level; concurrently, the percentage of total DoD 
spending invested in these capabilities has declined. 
Measuring the importance of caption clues 
Measuring the value of 
learning from experience 
The caption-retrieval interface for NPS images 
(http://triton.cs.nps.navy.mil:8080/rowe/navmulib.html) 

Inferred caption on left photograph: "maj general james b. taylor, commander of  
u.s. army central command-forward, reenlists staff sergeant danny george, senior 
 power generator equipment repairman of the 385th signal company."  









owned_by(v14,v22), a_kind_of(v22,'Signal Company'-0), 
property(v22,'385th'-50), rank(v22,385), 
quantification(v22,the), agent(v435,v11), 





part_of(v212,v8), a_kind_of(v8,'United States Army'-0)]). 
Automatic classification of email: 
“confusion matrix” 
 Category Name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 Classes 113 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 
2 Grades 30 111 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
3 Personal 4 0 110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38 0 0 0 0 
4 3270 0 0 8 29 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 40 0 0 30 0 19 
5 BWD Mess 0 0 60 0 37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 0 0 0 0 0 
6 Equipment 4 0 29 0 0 21 15 15 0 0 0 0 18 20 29 0 0 0 0 
7 EqmntAll 0 0 0 0 0 20 40 21 11 0 0 0 11 30 0 0 0 0 20 
8 
EqmntRead 
0 2 0 0 0 30 29 42 20 0 7 14 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 
9 
Exercises 
0 0 0 0 0 20 25 15 38 10 0 0 0 30 0 14 0 0 0 
10 Expeditor 0 0 0 0 6 15 17 20 30 18 0 1 0 45 0 0 0 0 0 
11 Fiscal 0 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 0 71 30 25 10 0 0 0 0 0 
12 General 0 0 0 50 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 19 0 63 0 7 2 0 4 
13 Maintenance 0 0 0 0 0 42 0 0 12 0 0 0 28 52 0 0 18 0 0 
14 Miscellaneous 1 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 120 0 0 0 0 7 
15 NBC 0 0 60 0 0 6 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 70 9 0 0 0 0 
16 Records * 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 Requests 0 0 40 0 0 20 0 15 0 0 13 17 0 0 0 0 47 0 0 
18 Sbrd Billeting 8 0 15 0 6 0 0 0 39 0 0 12 0 0 0 9 0 63 0 
19 InfoTech 70 0 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 10 
 
Finding the subject of a picture using only visual clues 
3. Automatic comparison of 
images and sensor data 
a.  Finding the difference between aerial 
photos of same terrain taken at different 
times 
b.  Automatic updating of terrain databases 
by comparing photos 
c.  Automatically tracking aircraft on the 
deck of a carrier 
d.  Do automatic surveillance with many 
sensors 
Finding the edges different between pictures at 
different times 

Example image segmentation into regions 
Finding buildings 
Tracking aircraft on a carrier deck 
today 
The problem of distinguishing aircraft 
 in a crowd 
Sensor "images" 
•  A sensor network provides a "virtual image" 
of its world. 
•  Can we infer what people are doing by  
periodically measuring simple properties 
with a sensor network?  (E.g find terrorists) 
•  Can we define "suspicious" behavior? 
•  Can we automatically reconfigure the sensor 




































Figure 5: Four example snapshots of behavior of people (stars) in an urban setting 
with buildings (rectangles). 
Snapshot 1 
Snapshot 4 Snapshot 3 
Snapshot 2 






4. Multi-agent simulation 
a.  Putting intelligent tutors on the Web 
b.  Operations simulations, like air 
defense 
c. Modeling cyber-attacks 
d. “Counterplanning” to foil plans 
e. Modeling a ship command center 
The old firefighting tutor 

Agents for modeling shipboard 
firefighting 
•  Command Center (CC): Monitors the sensors and 
alarms and gives order to the fire scene leader 
•  Scene leader (SL): Manages the fire team 
•  Electrician (E): Handles electrical tasks 
•  Nozzleman (N): Directs the fire hose when 
extinguishing, plus other tasks 
•  Hoseman (H): Helps with the hose, plus  other 
tasks 
•  Fire (F): Grows and wanes based on conditions, 
countermeasures, and random variation 
Firefighting plan tree for deterministic actions 
 record debriefed 




go to fire scene 
 report verified out 
equip 
deenergize 
 report deenergized 
report hose tended 
order hose tended 
set boundaries 
record fire report 
report fire report 





 tend hose 
 report no smoke 
order no smoke  report no water 
desmoke  report watched reflash order no water 
dewater estimate water  report safe gases order watched 
reflash 
watch reflash report safe oxygen 
 store equipment  test gases 
 test oxygen 
 test oxygen tester 
go to repair locker 
order safe 
gases 
order safe oxygen 
Note: precondition handling is below and to left; postcondition 
handling is below and to right. 
Agents shown:  
Command center – purple 
Scene leader – black 
Electrician – gray green 
Nozzleman – bright blue 
Hoseman – gray blue 
Mean time for firefighting team to complete all tasks 
 Calfee air-defense simulation 
ADC Simulation:  Tactical 
Display 
 Calfee air-defense system (2) 
ADC Simulation:  CIC W/S 
Display  & Watchstander 
Attributes Display 
 Calfee air-defense system (3) 
Watchstander Agent Contact Detection Process 
 Calfee air-defense system (4) 
Example Watchstander Agent Message Handling Structure 
Bayesian reasoning for air defense 
 
Systematic counterplanning 
•  Good for either wargames or tutors. 
•  Given a plan, evaluate the cost of every 
possible “ploy” at every state in the plan. 
•  Do this by calculating responses to the 
ploys and trying to inherit them forward and 
backward in time. 
•  Then to be maximally obstructive to an 
enemy plan, choose a subset of the best 
ploys that is minimally suspicious. 
Example cyber-attack plan 
install rootkit 
obtain admin status 
cause buffer overflow 
in port X 
connect to target 
machine on port X 
scan local network for ports 
with known vulnerabilities 
learn local network topology 
check for newly discovered 
vulnerabilities of common software 
guess password 








close ftp connection 
test rootkit 
login as admin 
logout 
install secure port X server 
download port 
X upgrade 






Example specifications for a cyber-attack 
start_state([file(rootkit,hackerhome), file(secureport,hackerhome), 
   compressed(rootkit,hackerhome), compressed(secureport,hackerhome)]). 
goal(hacker,[installed(rootkit,patsy), tested(rootkit,patsy), 
  installed(secureport,patsy), not(logged_in(_,_)), 




   [status(admin,Target), logged_in(admin,Target), file
(Executable,Target), 










   [],0.5,’Connection failed'). 
duration(Op,Agent,State,D,D2) :- durationmean(Op,M), skill(Agent,S), 
   D is M/S, D2 is D*0.75. 
durationmean(install(Executable,Target), 20). 
durationmean(get(admin,status,Target), 2). 











































14 15 16 17 18 19 
download 














rootkit test rootkit test rootkit test rootkit test rootkit 
26 
close ftp 






























47 30 11 











Numbers in boxes are state 
numbers. 
Integers outside boxes are 
duration from goal state. 
Decimals are transition 

























































14 15 16 17 18 19 
download 














rootkit test rootkit test rootkit test rootkit test rootkit 
26 
close ftp 
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Ploy deletion Ploy 
addition 
Weighted 
delay  (mins.) 
18 1 installed rootkit none 313.5 
18 2 installed secureport none 226.5 
18 1 tested rootkit none 135.6 
23 3 file secureport obtained none 55.0 
18 2 installed rootkit none 38.5 
7 1 logged in as administrator none 37.1 
10 1 file rootkit obtained none 21.0 
18 3 installed secureport none 14.3 
18 2 tested rootkit none 10.7 
1 1 know recent vulnerabilities none 10.1 
 
Lying: A new frontier in virtual reality 
•  An enemy may ask dangerous questions 
or give dangerous requests. 
•  Subordinates may lie to superiors when 
this gives better results and isn’t likely to 
be discovered. 
•  Superiors may lie about purposes of 
orders or even matters of fact to motivate. 
•  People want to put the best face on 
things, so they may stretch the truth. 
Some strategies for lying 
Suppose you want to do an action X against your enemy. 
 
  Stealth: Do X but don’t  reveal it.  Eventually it will 
be discovered.  Common in conventional warfare. 
  Excuse: Do X and give a false excuse why.  Earns 
respect until excuse found out. 
  Equivocation: Do X and give a correct but misleading 
reason why.  Like excuse but more coverable. 
  Outright lying: Do X but claim you didn’t.  
Eventually this will be discovered.  Often best method 
in a crisis. 
  Overplay: Do X ostentatiously to conceal some other 
less obvious deception.  Exploits the common human 
tendency to underestimate once one feels superior. 
  Reciprocal: Give a person a good reason to lie to you 
so they will pay less attention as you lie to them. 
Interpersonal deception theory 
•  Deception involves both “strategic” (planned) 
behaviors and unintentional behaviors. 
•  Deceiver tries to control deception through 
strategic choices, but unintentional behaviors 
“leak out” through other channels like body 
and facial movements 
•  Suspicion is the defensive counterpart of 
deception.  It increases the chance of 
disbelief, but only moderately increases 
detection probability. 
 
Lying relates to reputation management 
•  Some online Web services (e.g. EBay, 
Amazon) let consumers rate providers. 
•  Some of this rating represents the 
trustworthiness or reputation of the 
provider. 
•  Thus, such services provide a distributed 
reputation management manager. 
•  Automated trust management can provide 
trustworthiness reasoning with 
uncertainty for agents, even automated 
agents. 
5. Intelligent computer-aided 
instruction using AI 
a. The ship-navigation tutor and its extensions 
b. Tutors for procedural skills involving 
multiple agents 
c. Tutors for rule-based skills 
The navigation expert system 
The skills lattice for navigation tutoring 
The intrusion-detection tutor 

6. Route planning 
a. Find routes and mission plans for radar-
avoiding paths for autonomous aircraft 
b. Extract locations of military targets from 
natural-language intelligence reports, 
predict where targets could be now 
c. Plan routes in buildings for urban warfare 
 
Example of radar-avoiding routes 
Objective: Minimize Total Tracking Time 
1 Prowler 2 Prowlers 
3 Prowlers 
Minimum-energy routes for Fort Hunter-Liggett 
An optimal-path field for routes to the goal on the right 
An optimal-path field for routes to the goal at the bottom 
Optimal-path field for a goal point at Fort Hunter-Liggett 
A start at modeling urban warfare 
Example location extraction from text 
MSGID/IIR/PMOE//ITEMTYP/SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY OR OB ITEMS// 
ITEM/010/SILKWORM TEST FACILITYDEP/IBE:00001ZZ0001/CAT:00001/CTY:VX/Y// 
LOC/GEO:335000N0811500W/UTM:01ZZZ00010001// 
OTID/LTH:00001M/WTH:00001M/AZM:001/ELE:00001M/CMX:01L00001LL//STATACT/OCC// 
RMK/SUBJECT: IIR 1 517 0169 91/TARGETING INFORMATION --DESERT STORM--/(U)./ 
/SUMMARY:           HUSSEIN BUILT A NUCLEAR WEAPONS LABORATORY IN, 
/OR NEAR, RAWANDUZ.  A MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AIRFIELD OUTSIDE OF 
/BAGHDAD CAN SUPPORT MILITARY AIRCRAFT AND STORES DISGUISED 
/CHEMICALS. 
/ 
/TEXT: (U)/1.           HUSSEIN BUILT A NUCLEAR WEAPONS RESEARCH LABORATORY IN 
/OR NEAR RAWANDUZ (GEOCOORD: 3637N04431E) IZ.// 
  
Sentence #3 Subject [a nuclear weapons laboratory] Verb [] Link [in, or near,] 
Modifier [] Object [rawanduz] Time [] Coordinates [] Message Timestamp 
[1637z 03 july 1995] Weight 8199.0 
Sentence #4 Subject [agriculture airfield] Verb [] Link [outside of] Modifier 
[] Object [baghdad] Time [] Coordinates [] Message Timestamp [1637z 03 july 
1995] Weight 4099.5 
Sentence #4 Subject [military aircraft and stores] Verb [disguised] Link [] 
Modifier [] Object [] Time [] Coordinates [] Message Timestamp [1637z 03 
july 1995] Weight 2078.262816 
Sentence #7 Subject [laboratory] Verb [] Link [in or near] Modifier [] Object 
[rawanduz] Time [] Coordinates [3637n04431e] Message Timestamp [1637z 03 
july 1995] Weight 8199.0 
7. Ship identification using 
infrared imagery 
a. Modeling of ship shapes and differences 
between them 
b. Integrating visual clues with command-and-
control data 
Image, its processing, and best-matching ship model projection 
Ship identification using statistics about its boundary 
8. Software engineering 
a. Checking whether Web pages obey a 
written Web policy, by parsing the policy 
and interpreting the Web page 
b. Matching requirements between systems 






Key index terms 




(Policy-Element           Identifier Tool)!
Exception Exception 
(Handler) (Handler) 
Schema of applicable elements 
!





The natural-language front end to the policy workbench 
EXAMPLE POLICY INPUT
Information of questionable value to the general public must be evaluated
before worldwide dissemination to assess the risk to the DoD.
TAGGER OUTPUT
[ Information_NN  ]  of_IN  [ questionable_JJ value_NN  ]  to_TO  [ the_DT
general_JJ public_NN  ]   <  must_MD be_VB evaluated_VBN  >
before_IN  [ worldwide_JJ dissemination_NN  ]   <  to_TO assess_VB  >  [







determiner(risk,the), relationship(to), obj(dod), determiner(dod,the)]),
main_verb_Group([modal(must), passive(must,be), verb(must,evaluated)])]
Example requirements match 
AMPS-3-1-2-1-9-1  !
Requirement Text: MODEMS.  The AMPS 
shall contain the necessary hardware 
and S/W drivers required to exchange 
files via a standard (i.e. Hayes 
compatible) modem.!
JMPS-006-03220 !
Requirement Text: JMPS Data 
Communications shall support 
exchanges via modem on external 
telecommunications circuits 
including worldwide commercial 
communications lines, Defense 
Messaging System (DMS) circuits, and 
tactical communications circuits.!
Similarity Value = 0.3037!
 
Specific topics 
•  Develop decoy Web servers that confuse 
attackers. 
•  Develop creative decoy behaviors using 
generative grammars. 
•  Create offensive deceptive tactics. 
•  Use coordinated intrusion detection across 
computers to detect multi-computer attacks. 
•  Automatically find new hacker methods 
from Web sites and summarize it. 
Specific topics, page 2 
•  Build a neural network that learns to 
classify Web pages. 
•  Infer dangerous areas of terrain from 
natural-language intelligence reports. 
•  Use the output of the aerial-image 
comparison program to find new buildings 
and roads. 
•  Identify aircraft positions on a carrier flight 
deck from multiple cameras (at sides of 
deck, in the deck, on the island).  
•  Automatically counterplan to foil cyber-
attacks involving admin-status compromise. 
Specific topics, page 3 
•  Implement METUTOR multi-agent planning 
package as a Java applet-constructor for the 
Web. 
•  Model emotions like "anger" and "fear" in 
simulated agents in a two-dimensional world. 
•  Develop a training aid for urban warfare using 
multi-agent simulation. 
•  Apply the means-ends tutor to the teaching of 
vehicle repair using graphics. 
•  Extend the navigation tutor to handle other ship 
tasks. 
Specific topics, page 4 
•  Draw maps of where the enemy could be now 
given intelligence reports in English text. 
•  Develop methods for managing massively 
parallel sensor networks of small devices. 
•  Improve the infrared ship-classification to 
identify the ships from a list of known nearby 
ships. 
•  Automatically check if Web pages conform to 
policy. 
•  Parse and interpret comments on a program to 
index it. 
